German voters maintained some global trends over the weekend. They drove out the incumbent, and their youngster moved to the right, bringing another surprise. Their radical anti-immigrant party (alternative Für Deutschland, or AFD) finished second, and could have been boosted by some LGBTQ voters.
The right-hand shift of gay, lesbian and bisexual voters is a dynamic performance in Western Europe. In the UK, France and now Germany, gay voters or their allies support far-right or naturalist parties in growth rates. But that strange shift doesn't seem to have happened in the US. During the 2024 election, LGBTQ voters were actually gained more More democratic than 2020.
What does this bay explain, especially since many other global political trends replicate themselves in the US?
After reviewing trends and historical backgrounds, I offer two theories. This means that Europeans experience a lot differently than Europeans in the US. And that the American LGBTQ community has historical reasons for distrust of radical Republicans in its two-party system.
The shift between gay people and their allies in Europe
In the past, the increasing public acceptance of oddity and homosexuality were considered to be, or at least conform to, a general progressive view on political issues both within and outside the United States. But that doesn't seem to be true.
In Germany, these trends can be traced back to the pre-pandemic. Multiple analyses of LGBTQ voters found that the 2021 elections had little support from gay voters for the AFD and central right parties when compared to the 2017 federal elections. One study even found that LGBTQ people would increase the likelihood of voting for AFD in 2021. This year, one pre-election survey suggested that AFD receives the largest share of LGBTQ voters' support among major parties. (It would have never hurt AFD, who has this year's charismatic gay leader.)
As researcher and political analyst François Valentin writes, this dynamic is true in France, with the UK returning in 2015. One analysis of vote choices in 2015 is that in elections in areas that married far-off parties in France, the level of far-off parties (FN), direct current women of fn are married (FN). woman. Meanwhile, FN experienced refreshment, becoming hostile and courted to LGBTQ people.
In the UK, the centre-left Labour Party has generally received strong support from lesbian, gay and bisexual voters, but far-right parties have struggled to gain a significant share of these voters in recent years. However, across Europe, different types of voters have emerged. One has a progressive view of homosexuality, but a conservative or reactionary view of immigration.
According to one analysis prepared for the London School of Economics, almost a third of UK voters could fall under this “gay” classification.
Far-right parties in France and Germany have opposed stricter policies against immigrants and refugees, particularly doubting Islam, European Union integration, and have focused on almost surprising revitalizing the identity of natives or nationals. The British Conservatives embrace many of these naturalist ideals.
Jesse Grainger, a British researcher at King's College London, suggests that it focuses on immigration, suggesting that naturalism could be key to understanding the growing support of LGBTQ voters for the far right.
“Cultural studies also theorize that Pro-LGBT attitudes may be on the rise because “For immigrants,” he wrote: liberal Population from The rear Immigrant Population – Construction of tolerant and intolerant binaries. ”
In other words, far-right parties in Europe have created various binaries about identity, safety and public safety that oppose immigrants and strange people. And queer voters who are unhappy with the status quo are welcomed by new or rehabilitated far-right parties, particularly in France and Germany.
Why are “same-gayists” not yet getting their foothold in the US?
Not only have LGBTQ voters not only haven't seen the same right drift as their European counterparts, they've actually seen the opposite. From 1992 to 2016, exit polls show that this massive number of voters has become more liberal. (Exit votes can be loud and unreliable and are usually revised a few months after the election, but they are the best tool for measuring trends in groups like LGBTQ voters.)
In 2020, polls suggested the right direction for queer voters. Trump has reduced the democratic victory margin in democratic statistics by 20 percentage points compared to 2016. 2024 was referring to another year of Republican improvements with these voters.
However, the end result was a different twist. Kamala Harris has earned the highest level of support from LGBTQ voters in modern history. 86%. In fact, LGBTQ voters were one of the only demographics that changed to the left last year. And their ideology remains consistently liberal. 47% of LGBTQ men and 63% of LGBTQ women identify as liberals.
For now, the outlook for an increase in the right-wing LGBTQ movement in the US appears to face more hurdles.
The explanations here vary. It starts with the unique American political experience of the gay rights movement. But one important thing to understand is that while most European countries have a multipart system that can give the feeling that the most extreme positions of a particular party are checked by a rival team, there are really only two political parties in the US.
And while both began to make gay rights hostile, Democrats were quick to tolerate, accept and defend LGBTQ people.
The Republicans were far more hostile. This has been especially true over the past five years. This has been characterized by the fears of GOPs over trans-athletes, bathrooms, “grooming” and “don't say gay” laws. In this way, the Republicans have gone in the opposite direction of many European far-right or right-wing parties who have overturned homophobic or prejudiced speeches and positions.
Young queer people may be off the pitch of any kind of ideology or policy from Republicans who have transformed them into prejudice, discriminatory or hostile speeches and policies. And those who do sour things in GOP have only two real options. Join Democrats or ignore the political process completely.
Demography also explains part of the liberalism of American LGBTQ voters. In the US, LGBTQ people are distorting young people and women, some of the electorals who are more likely to retain a more liberal view. And it specifically identifies the small but growing share of Gen Z as transgender. In other words, the Republican shift towards trans people and trans rights could turn off potential future voters who have cemented ideological and partisan identities early in political activity.
And immigrants don't act as a wedge problem, just as it has for European LGBT voters and voters who support gay marriage and gay rights. The challenges of America's own immigration are far less than what European countries have experienced. Places like France and Germany have endured more shocks due to the size of the refugee and migrant influx over the past decade, the degree of security and terrorist threat they faced, and the relative size of their new foreign population. Our own American myth of being an immigrant land has made the country more embraced for immigrants over the past 30 years. It was only recently that the country has taken a sharp anti-immigrant turn, mainly due to concerns about economic unrest and public order.
And some Republican activists and politicians have used the same rhetorical approach to persuade male gay voters (mainly) but less successful than the far-right parties in Europe.
Of course, none of these dynamics are set on stones, and ideology can continue to change. But for now, the outlook for an increase in right-wing LGBTQ movements in the US appears to face more hurdles.
